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Abstract— Secure access of communication networks has become 
an increasingly important area of consideration for the 
communication service providers of present day. Broadband 
Wireless Access (BWA) networks are proving to be an efficient 
and cost-effective solution for the provisioning of high rate 
wireless traffic links in static and mobile domains. The secure 
access of these networks is necessary to ensure their superior 
operation and revenue efficacy. Although authentication process 
is a key to secure access in BWA networks, the breaches present
in them limit the network’s performance. In this paper, the 
vulnerabilities in the authentication frameworks of BWA 
networks have been unveiled. Moreover, this paper also describes 
the limitations of these protocols and of the solutions proposed to 
them due to the involved computational complexities and 
overheads. The possible attacks on privacy and performance of 
BWA networks have been discussed and explained in detail.
Keywords- Comutational Complexity; Authentication; Security; 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) is rapidly emerging as 
the standard for future communication networks. The ease of 
deployment combined with low operational and maintenance 
costs makes BWA the preferred choice for modern 
communication service providers. The BWA or WiMAX 
(World-wide Interoperability for Microwave Access) networks 
work on the protocols defined in the IEEE 802.16 standard [1].
IEEE 802.16 has two revisions: 802.16d termed as fixed 
WiMAX and 802.16e termed as mobile WiMAX [2]. The 
deployments of WiMAX networks are growing rapidly to 
achieve seamless mobility followed by worldwide broadband 
communications. 
Authentication of users and of equipment in the BWA 
network is done as a part of the admission control process. The 
authentication phase is also carried out while execution of 
handoffs in mobile BWA networks. The authentication and
service authorization process is carried out at the privacy sub-
layer, embedded in the WiMAX protocol stack [1], [3]. A 
complete protocol ensuring secure distribution and 
management of keying data between network entities is 
incorporated in this layer, known as Privacy and Key 
Management protocol (PKM) [1]. Launch of 802.16d in 2004 
and 802.16e in 2005 suggests that the standard is in the initial 
phase of implementation and several dormant issues and short 
comings will be highlighted with progress in deployment and 
service provisioning.
Network security and legitimate service access is a 
concealed performance indicator in providing Quality of 
Service (QoS) to users. In this paper, the pitfalls in the current 
authentication frameworks have been unveiled, the reasons for 
the breaches have been identified and the causes, been 
analyzed to highlight the limitations of the existing protocols.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
introduce the existing authentication frameworks. Section III 
describes the attacks on authentication. Section IV highlights 
the computational complexities and overheads involved in the 
existing protocols and Section V concludes our discussion.
II. AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORKS
A. Privacy & Key Management Protocol version 1:
The PKM v1 protocol complies with the 802.16d-2004 
standard and is operating in the Fixed WiMAX networks. This 
protocol is a 3-step protocol involving 1-way authentication.
The figure 1 shows the PKM v1 authentication model and 
messages involved.
Figure 1. Privacy and Key Management Protocol version 1 [5]
The detailed operation of PKM v1 can be found in [1], [4] 
and [5]. PKM v1 is based on X.509 certificate based Public 
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Key Infrastructure (PKI). Figure 1 shows the information flow 
between Subscriber Station (SS) and Base Station (BS). The 
individual components of the message have been addressed in 
[1] and [5]. In step 2, a nonce (NSS) is shown which is a 64-bit 
number generated randomly to be used as a message linking 
token [4]. Basic Connection Identity Code (BCID) is used to 
identify a particular node in the network and is assigned to the 
node during the admission control process.
B. Privacy &Key Management Protocol version 2:
PKM v2 protocol was defined in 802.16e-2005 and is 
implemented in Mobile WiMAX networks. This protocol is not 
essentially a variant of PKM v1. However, PKM v1 and v2 
share a common service authorization structure. PKM v2 is a 
4-step, 3-way authentication protocol. The operational 
mechanism of PKM v2 is illustrated in [2] and [6]. Figure 2 
depicts the PKM v2 authentication framework. 
Figure 2. Privacy and Key Management Protocol version 2 [6]
The major enhancements in PKM v2 are the inclusion of 
digital certificates (DS) and authorization acknowledgement 
step. Moreover, except step 1, a nonce (NSS or NBS) has been 
incorporated with each message to link successive steps of the 
protocol.
C. The Time Stamp Authorization (TSA) Model:
This model has been proposed by Sen Xu et al. in [7] and 
introduces timestamps to ensure message authenticity. This 
proposal is a variant of PKM v1 which has timestamps placed 
on all messages to certify the freshness of the message. Each 
node in the network (BS or SS) maintains a timestamp table 
which contains the timestamps of all the messages received; 
therefore, preventing the message replays. Furthermore, a key 
management strategy for inter-BS key management and 
exchange has also been proposed along with this protocol in 
[7]. This model specifically focuses and enhances PKM v1 
authorization model and is aimed for fixed WiMAX networks.
D. Hybrid Authorization (HA) Model:
Ayesha Altaf et al., in [6], propose a model which employs 
a hybrid approach involving nonce and timestamps to prevent 
the attacks on privacy and key management protocols. This 
proposal claims to cater the effect of interleaving attacks
discussed in [7] and [8] which may occur on PKM v2. The 
approach is presented for mobile WiMAX networks and 
enhances the PKM v2 authentication framework.
E. Improved Secure Network Authentication Protocol:
This model has been proposed in [4] and aims to 
restructure the authentication framework by introducing a 
single protocol for both fixed and mobile networks. It has been 
introduced to cover some of the major threats highlighted in 
[6], [7] and [9]. Improved Secure Network Authentication 
Protocol (ISNAP) has been designed and optimized by 
utilizing the existing system resources involving minimum 
overhead. The proposed model of ISNAP is shown in figure 3.
Figure 3. Improved Secure Network Authentication Protocol [4]
The detailed structure and working of ISNAP has been 
discussed in [4].
III. ATTACKS ON AUTHENTICATION
Attacks on authentication can be described as the ways by 
which a network can be intruded and the privacy of the users 
be compromised. The secure access of network services is 
becoming an increasingly important issue in the present
communication infrastructures. Any attempts of an interloper 
to get registered with the network illegitimately or to create 
chaos in it, is possible; if the user authentication and 
authorization stage is compromised. Therefore, the ways to 
breach the authentication frameworks are termed as attacks on 
privacy and key management protocols and their variants.
A. Water-Torture Attack:
The Water-Torture attack is aimed to perturb the network’s
operation by causing flooding. There are some messages which 
are used to initiate cyclic processes when received on any node. 
Transmission of such a message can be seen in figure 1 and 
figure 2 as McerSS. McerSS is the manufacturer’s X.509 
certificate which is used by the SS to show its presence in the 
network and to initiate the authentication protocol [5]. In the 
admission control process, the reception of this message at BS 
initiates the cyclic authentication procedure. In the event of a 
Water-Torture attack, these triggering messages are captured 
and are transmitted in a loop to cause trigger flooding; thus, 
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creating artificial congestion at the BS. This attack can be 
extended to create a management chaos and blocking in the 
network’s domain, especially, where remote power feeding is
employed. PKM v1 & v2, TSA Model and the HA model are 
influenced by this attack as there is no method to detect if 
McerSS has been transmitted by an authentic SS or has been 
replayed by an intruder.
B. Denial of Service Attack:
While dealing with radio frequency networks we come 
across certain entities which maintain a cause and effect 
relationship between them. The Denial of Service (DoS), in 
this case, is one of the results of the Water-Torture attack. Due 
to the engaged resources and falsified congestion, the requests 
for authentication, key exchange and securing admission to the 
network are not entertained. This causes a severe degradation 
of QoS, therefore, resulting in heavy revenue losses. The 
protocols subjected to Water-Torture attack are, naturally, also 
subjected to DoS attack.
C. Message Replay Attack:
This attack, under its footprint, covers a large number of 
intrusion methods which are based on the employment of the 
described approach. This attack involves the capturing and re-
use of the messages in the authentication cycles. The re-use can 
be based on a specific message or on a set of messages 
exchanged during a complete session. PKM v1 is not supported 
with any mechanism to counter this attack. However, PKM v2 
partially counters this attack by employing nonce in message 2 
and 3 as shown in figure 2. Nonce being a 64-bit random 
number has (264)-1 probability of repetition and is very difficult 
to be predicted. It does prove useful to link subsequent 
messages and helps to resolve the replay issues to a partial 
extent. Hence, PKM v1 is a victim of replay attacks while 
PKM v2, partially not completely, is secure. The TSA model 
proposes timestamps instead of nonce while the HA model 
demands the use of nonce in conjunction with timestamps, but
both models present significant overhead, as discussed in next 
section.
D. Identity Theft:
The SS equipment in the network is provisioned with the 
services on the basis of the physical (MAC address) registered 
in the network. In case of fixed BWA networks, the MAC 
identities are registered permanently for each SS, however, in 
mobile BWA networks, the MAC ID is registered each time a 
node joins the network or performs handoffs. Hence, PKM v1 
is not exposed to this attack, but, as in figure 2, PKM v2 and 
HA model are vulnerable to this attack as message 4 contains 
MAC identity in both encrypted and unencrypted form. There 
are several devices available at the present day which can be 
reprogrammed with variable MAC addresses [6], [9].
E. Impersonation:
Impersonation refers to the type of attack in which one node 
masquerades another node. There are several ways in which 
impersonation can be achieved like by message replay or while 
employing one-way authentication [12]. The PKM v1 model 
and Time-Stamp authentication model are vulnerable to this 
type of infringement attempt. The reason for this is one-way 
authentication i.e., BS authenticates SS but vice versa does not
occur. Moreover, this attack is aimed to compromise the 
security of the users and poses severe threats in case of 
employment of BWA infrastructure in security and defense 
installations for any realm.
F. Interleaving Attack:
Interleaving attack is a sub-class of Man-in-the-Middle 
attacks and is specifically aimed for PKM v2. In this attack, an 
adversary interleaves a communication session by maintaining
connections with the BS and SS, pertaining as SS to BS and 
vice versa. All the information on route passes through the 
adversary node and thus an information leakage point is built
[8]. The backbone of interleaving attack is the re-transmission 
of a set of messages from the same session. The HA model 
proposes an approach to cater the interleaving attack by 
introducing transmission and storage overheads in the network
[6].
G. Suppress Replay Attack:
This method of gaining forged access to the network 
services takes advantage of the fact that perfect 
synchronization must be maintained to protect the 
authentication session from intrusion. Due to the loss of 
synchronization in the clocks of the entities, an intruder can 
gain control on the authentication framework by capturing the 
messages and transmitting them with added delays, thus 
causing forward message replay [6]. This class of attack is 
difficult to counter and is vulnerable for the Timestamp 
Authentication model. The Hybrid Authentication model can 
also be manipulated by this attack.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITIES AND OVERHEADS
The Timestamp Authentication model, Hybrid 
Authentication Model and ISNAP have been put forth to 
remove the threats posed to the standardized protocols PKM v1 
and PKM v2. The first two models focus their predecessors i.e. 
PKM v1 and PKM v2, respectively, for removal of threats; 
however, ISNAP focuses on a single solution for fixed and 
mobile BWA networks, solving the existing problems. The 
proposed models, along with the enhancements, offer 
computational complexities and storage overheads as discussed 
in this section.
A. Timestamp Validation:
The TSA model, HA model and ISNAP model have been 
put forth to remove the threats posed to the standardized 
protocols PKM v1 and PKM v2. The first two models focus 
their predecessors i.e. PKM v1 and PKM v2, respectively, for 
removal of threats; however, ISNAP model focuses on a single 
solution for fixed and mobile BWA networks, along with 
eradication of the posed threats.
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Timestamps are freshness guards for messages. These 
timestamps, used to eliminate replays, are recorded in
timestamp tables. These tables contain the timestamps for all 
the messages previously received and are used to compare the 
timestamp of any newly received message with the recorded 
ones. The presence of the newly received timestamp in the 
tables leads towards the detection of a replay, or otherwise, a 
validation of message.
The timestamp tables consume memory for the storage of 
prior timestamps from messages and also consume a large 
number of computational cycles to compare the arriving 
timestamp with the recorded ones. Let ∂ be the number of 
bytes in the memory for storage of one timestamp and ρ be the 
number of days for which the records are maintained in the 
table. Then we have in (1) as:
 x∂ x ρ 
where χ is storage overhead caused by the timestamp tables 
expressed in bytes/node and  is the minimum number of 
messages exchanged between two communicating nodes per 
day. Generally, to counter the replays, timestamp records are 
maintained in the tables for an optimum amount of time. Thus, 
assuming ∂ and ρ to be 4 bytes (as in a UNIX based 
environment) and 15 days, if  be a minimum of 100 
messages validated per day, the value of χ approaches to 6 
Kilobytes to be maintained for each node. Hence for a BS 
serving 64 SSs, this can lead to 0.3 Megabytes of minimum 
static memory reserved by timestamp tables at each BS.
A very general implementation of timestamp comparison 
on UNIX based operating system suggests that a minimum of 
2 floating point instructions are used for comparison of one
timestamp. Therefore, the machine cycles for comparison of 
the timestamps can be calculated by (2) as:
  
where α is the number of computational cycles used in the 
timestamp validation process. Thus, we can have the number 
of floating point instructions per second (FLOPS) in (3) as:
 FLOPS = α x (σ)-1 
where σ is the number of machine cycles per second for any 
particular system (SS or BS). The above analysis suggests that 
the number of FLOPS used in the timestamp validation 
process will be significantly large depending upon the amount 
of records maintained and the constriction time required to 
counter replay attacks. The final expression for the number of 
FLOPS becomes:
FLOPSρ.∂) x (σ)-1 
The above analysis suggests that the storage overhead is 
quite significant in terms of reserving the memory resources for 
any system and can be optimized by enhancement of the 
timestamp table comparison method. The proposed models to
rectify the threats discussed in section III, the TSA model and 
the HA model, are subject to severe limitations discussed 
above. ISNAP model, however, offers the replacement of the 
timestamp table method by offering a validation procedure 
based on mathematical evaluations [4]. In this case, a 
timestamp is subjected to a mathematical condition; if the 
condition is fulfilled, the message is validated, else the message 
is contradicted. Therefore, ISNAP’s validation procedure 
reduces the storage overheads to very considerable limits by 
removing the need for maintaining record tables.
B. Transmission Overheads:
In order to minimize the posed threats, different sentinels 
are to be introduced in the authentication frameworks. This 
increases the transmission overhead for the verification 
procedures; therefore, establishing a cost and benefit 
relationship between the security and increased transmission.
Figure 4. Transmission Overheads
Figure 4 shows the comparative transmission overheads of 
the proposed models with their standardized counterparts.
ISNAP model poses lesser transmission than Hybrid 
Authentication model by removing some redundant 
components like unencrypted MAC ID in the last message. As 
for the TSA model, as it is a variant of PKM v1, the fixed 
network protocol, ISNAP requires substantially more 
transmission. However, the cost and benefit relation is justified 
due to the removal of several major attacks in ISNAP and 
reduction in storage resources.
Combined with overheads involving storage resources and 
transmission overheads, the maximum operating cost is offered 
by the proposed HA model and afterwards TSA Model and 
ISNAP model have comparable outlays. However, based on 
the performance of these proposed solutions, ISNAP provides 
optimum protection against intrusion and unauthorized use of 
network resources.
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C. Resynchronization Scheme:
The involvement of clock based parameters in 
authentication procedures suggests that the clocks of the 
involved systems must be well synchronized to allow for a 
successful handshake between the intervening nodes. The 
synchronization scheme in WiMAX networks has remained an 
issue as discussed in [10] and there remains probability of 
errors in the clocks [11]; allowing intrusion activity. Although 
the ISNAP model suggests a solution to this issue, the analysis 
and implementation of the synchronization schemes has yet to 
be performed to reach a satisfactory conclusion.
D. Initiation of Authentication Procedure:
In PKM v1, PKM v2, Timestamp Authentication Model 
and Hybrid Authentication model, the trigger message for 
initiating the handshake procedure cannot be protected against 
the class of replay attacks. ISNAP model proposes a solution to 
this vulnerability but demands the clocks to be synchronized. 
V. CONCLUSION
The authentication protocols standardized in the WiMAX 
or BWA networks are faced with a number of vulnerabilities 
which are critical to smooth operation of the network and 
demand shear attention. The proposed solutions to the posed 
threats have been, up to some extent, successful in sorting out 
the issues but not feasible enough in terms of the proposed 
complexities and overheads. However, ISNAP model has been 
optimum in terms of solving the security issues along with 
offering optimized use of resources. Nevertheless, 
optimization of operations for validation procedures and finest 
use of system resources to furnish secure network access is 
required and demands more research in this area.
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